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I Introduction
Over the last two decades, technological innovations have dramatically increased
the speed of trading in global financial markets. The time it takes for messages to
travel within and between financial markets is now measured in micro- and millisec-
onds and is limited, for the most part, only by the speed of light. Although most
would agree that extremely long delays in markets are undesirable, it is unclear if
millisecond or microsecond speeds are really necessary – perhaps they are even harm-
ful.
How does market speed affect investors? Are faster speeds always more desirable,
or are there limits to the benefits of speed? Is there an optimal speed of trading, and
if so, what determines this speed?
To help answer these questions, we model the trading of a security via periodic
batch auctions and study how market quality is affected as the clearing frequency is
changed. In the model, the optimal clearing frequency depends on three factors: (1)
the volatility of the security, (2) the intensity of trading in the security, and (3) the
correlation of the security’s value with the market security. All else equal, a security
should be traded faster if its volatility is higher, slower if its intensity of trade is lower,
and faster if its correlation with the market is higher. Using rough estimates of these
values, we determine that the optimal time interval of trade for a typical U.S. stock
is currently 0.2 to 0.9 seconds.
Our model is based on the batch auction model of Garbade and Silber (1979). Al-
though their paper is primarily focused on studying liquidity, the model they develop
lends itself nicely to an analysis of speed in markets. In their model, the liquidity of
the market is maximized at intermediate auction intervals, when markets are neither
too fast or too slow. The reason behind this intermediate result is rather intuitive.
If markets are too fast, then very few orders are mixed in each market clearing and
transaction prices will not coincide with equilibrium values. If markets are too slow,
then orders will sit for long periods of time and prices will have shifted by the time
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the orders clear. In either case, because speeds are not set appropriately, market
quality is harmed.
We modify the model in Garbade and Silber (1979) in two ways. First, we assume
that investors’ reservation prices are normally distributed around current equilibrium
prices (instead of a future equilibrium price as in the original model). We therefore
can derive market quality as a function of the arrival time of an investor. Second, we
add a market security. The addition of the market security is especially important.
Liquidity providers can use information about the market to push the price of the
original security closer to its equilibrium value, which allows the security to trade
faster. For example, a security that has correlation ρ = 0.5 with the market will have
an optimal speed that is 11% faster than if the market security were not present.
The effect becomes even more pronounced for higher correlations: a security with
ρ = 0.85 will have an optimal speed 729% faster compared to the case without a
market security.
To present analytic results, we assume that the market security is infinitely liquid
and therefore trades at infinitely short intervals. Interestingly, we find that this
continuous trading property can be transmitted to other securities. Specifically, we
find that it is optimal for a security to also trade at infinitely short intervals if its
correlation with the market is above or below a critical threshold of ρc = ±
√
3/4.
This continuous trading result holds regardless of the other properties of the security.
The theoretical literature on the optimal clearing frequency of markets is relatively
sparse. To the best of our knowledge, Garbade and Silber (1979) were the first to show
that market quality for an average investor is maximized for intermediate clearing
frequencies, i.e., most markets should neither operate continuously nor be cleared
very infrequently. Later on, studies were less concerned with determining the optimal
speed of markets, but rather compared continuous and periodic market clearings in
general (e.g., Madhavan (1992) and Budish et al. (2013)).
More recently, Farmer and Skouras (2012), Budish et al. (2013), and Cochrane
(2013) have proposed periodic market clearings as a method to mitigate an “arms
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race” for speed among liquidity providers and the eventual over-investment in tech-
nology that results.1 Notably, these papers do not include an analysis of the optimal
time between clearings, nor do they allow welfare improvements due to higher speed.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the relationship between the liq-
uidity of an asset and its correlation with the overall market. In a recent empirical
study, Chan et al. (2013) show that the liquidity of a security increases with the
fraction of volatility due to systematic risk, exactly as predicted in our model. Fur-
thermore, they find that improvement in liquidity following the addition of a stock
to the S&P 500 Index is directly related to the stocks increase in correlation with
the market. Baruch and Saar (2009) and Gerig and Michayluk (2014) both model
the relationship between the liquidity of a security and its correlation with other
securities. In their models, as in our model, liquidity providers can form a better
estimate of prices when observing order flow from correlated assets which improves
overall market quality.
II Baseline Model
As in Garbade and Silber (1979), we consider a single security that is traded by
public investors in a market with periodic clearings. (In later sections, we consider the
addition of liquidity providers and also a second security.) The time interval between
clearings is τ , and ultimately, we will be interested in determining the optimal τ from
an average investor’s perspective.2
Between clearings, investors (indexed in each interval by i) arrive at a constant
rate ω and submit excess demand schedules to the market. These demand schedules
are unobservable to other investors and remain in the market until the next market
clearing. At each clearing, the transaction price is set to the value that clears the
market, i.e., to the value that produces zero aggregate excess demand. The excess
1The core idea behind socially wasteful investment in speed was originally discussed in Hirshleifer
(1971) and Stiglitz (1989).
2Note that we attempt to keep our notation as consistent as possible with Garbade and Silber’s
original paper.
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demand schedule of the ith investor is a linearly increasing function of the reservation
price of the investor, ri, and a linear decreasing function of the clearing price, p,
D(p) = a(ri − p), (1)
where a is a positive constant assumed the same for all investors.3 Note that the ith
investor will be a net seller of the security if ri < p and will be a net buyer if ri > p.
Between any two clearings, a total number K = ωτ investors will submit excess
demand schedules to the market. The market clearing price is the unique price that




a(ri − p). (2)
Rearranging the equation reveals that the clearing price is the average reservation





We assume there exists an unobservable equilibrium price for the security, mt, at
all times and that the reservation price of investor i is normally distributed around the
prevailing equilibrium price, mt−1+i/τ (which we denote mi for short), at the instant
the investor decides to trade,4
ri = mi + gi, (4)
gi ∼ N(0, σ2), (5)
3A linear demand function arises when agents optimize a quadratic utility function subject to
their budget constraint.
4In Garbade and Silber (1979), the investor decides to trade at time t−1/2 but has a reservation
price that is normally distributed around the future equilibrium price at time t. We have chosen
a different setup (which we believe is more natural) where the reservation price of an investor
is normally distributed around the instantaneous equilibrium price at the time he/she decides to
trade. This departure means that our equations will use the average equilibrium price over the
interval τ rather than the instantaneous equilibrium price as in Garbade and Silber (1979).
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where gi is assumed to be uncorrelated across investors. We denote by r̄t the average
reservation price of the investors at market clearing t (which is the market clearing




(mi + gi)/K. (6)
We denote by m̄t the average equilibrium price over the interval, m̄t =
∑
imi/K, and
we denote by ft the average of gi, i.e., ft =
∑
i gi/K. Note that,
r̄t = m̄t + ft, (7)
ft ∼ N(0, σ2/(ωτ)). (8)
We assume that the instantaneous equilibrium price mt evolves as a driftless Brow-





for convenience and its purpose will become apparent in the following equation).
Therefore, the average equilibrium price for investors at clearing t evolves according
to the following equation,
m̄t = m̄t−1 + et, (9)
et ∼ N(0, τψ2), (10)
where we have used the result that the variance of the difference between two con-

















As in Garbade and Silber (1979), we measure market quality with an inverse
liquidity metric called liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is defined as the variance of the
difference between the equilibrium value of the security when an investor arrives at
the market, mi, and the transaction price ultimately realized for the investor’s trade,
in this case r̄t.
5 The liquidity risk for investor i in a market without liquidity providers
is therefore,
VP = Var[r̄t −mi], (12)
= Var[(r̄t − m̄t) + (m̄t −mi)], (13)
= Var[r̄t − m̄t] + Var[m̄t −mi], (14)
where the two expressions in parentheses separate because there is no covariance
between them. The variance of the first term, Var[r̄t − m̄t], is just the variance of ft.
For the second term, the variance depends on the arrival time of the investor. If the
investor arrives at a point in time that is a fraction φ of the total interval τ from the
previous clearing, then the variance of the second term will be,















φ3 + (1− φ)3
]
τψ2. (16)
If the investor arrives at the beginning or end of the interval (φ = 0 or φ = 1), then
the variance is at its maximum value, (1/2)τψ2, and if the investor arrives in the
middle of the interval (φ = 1/2), the variance is at its minimum value, (1/8)τψ2. The




φ3 + (1− φ)3
]
τψ2. (17)
5Grossman and Miller (1988) use a very similar definition of liquidity risk.
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If we assume that the timing of an investor’s trading decision is uncorrelated with




(φ3 + (1− φ)3) = 1/2. Liquidity risk for the average investor is therefore,6
VP = σ
2/(ωτ) + τψ2/4. (18)
Notice that liquidity risk is increasing in the volatility of the security, increasing in
the variance of investor reservation prices, and decreasing in the frequency of investor
arrival. The effect of the clearing frequency (1/τ) on liquidity risk is nonlinear. When
market clearings are frequent, this decreases the difference between the clearing price
and the average equilibrium price of the security, but it also increases the difference
between the average equilibrium price of the security and the specific equilibrium
price used as a reference by the investor. There is a “Goldilocks” value for τ that
optimizes the tradeoff between these two effects, and we determine this value below.
The optimal trading interval τ ∗P from an investor’s perspective is just the value of
τ that minimizes liquidity risk. This value can be found by taking the derivative of
liquidity risk with respect to τ and setting to zero,












In Fig. 1, we plot liquidity risk as a function of the time between market clearings,
τ , when ψ = 1, σ = 1, and ω = 10. We also show the optimal point (V ∗P , τ
∗
P ).
6Our equation for liquidity risk is slightly different from that of Garbade and Silber (1979)
because of the modifications we have made to their setup.
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Figure 1: Liquidity risk, VP , as a function of the time between market clearings, τ , in
a public market without a liquidity provider. Parameters used in the plot are ψ = 1,
σ = 1, and ω = 10. The optimal point (V ∗P , τ
∗
P ) is shown with an asterisk. Also shown
are the components of liquidity risk σ2/(ωτ) and τψ2/4.
III Model with a Liquidity Provider
As discussed in Garbade and Silber (1979), enterprising individuals can devise
a better estimate for the equilibrium price than is contained in the market clearing
price rt and can profit by buying and selling according to this estimate. In effect,
these speculators act as liquidity providers in the market.
Here, we assume that a single competitive and risk neutral liquidity provider
exists, that she observes the aggregate excess demand of the market directly before
the market is cleared, and that she submits an excess demand schedule at each market
clearing such that the clearing price always equals her estimate of the equilibrium
price. Many of the seminal market microstructure papers published after Garbade
and Silber (1979) (such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)) assume the
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same type of competitive, risk neutral liquidity provider. However, in these other
models, the benefit of the liquidity provider cannot be analyzed, whereas it can in
Garbade and Silber’s framework. Below we show that the liquidity provider reduces
the minimum liquidity risk of public investors by a factor of 1.5. In the next section,
we show that when the liquidity provider is further enabled so that she observes the
price of the market security, liquidity risk is reduced even further.
A Liquidity
The liquidity provider observes the order flow of the public investors and therefore
r̄t. This information allows her to form an estimate of the average equilibrium price
over the interval, which we denote by m̂t. Because she is competitive and risk neutral,
she submits a demand schedule that forces the clearing price to this value. Therefore,
in the equation for liquidity risk, the clearing price is m̂t instead of r̄t.
The model with a liquidity provider is a special case of the model presented in the
next section. Here, we just present results for liquidity risk and leave details of the
derivation to the next section and the Appendix.
VL = Var[(m̂t − m̄t) + (m̄t −mi)], (21)
= Var[m̂t − m̄t] + Var[m̄t −mi] + 2 Cov[m̂t − m̄t, m̄t −mi], (22)
=
2 (φ1 + 2φ2) τψ






















φ3 + 2(1− φ)3 + 3(1− φ)φ2
]
. (25)
As before, assuming that the investor’s arrival time is not correlated with the timing
9



































τ ∗P , (28)











Notice that with the liquidity provider, the optimal clearing frequency (1/τ ∗L) in-
creases by a factor of
√
3 ≈ 1.7 from the public market case (regardless of the other
parameters). In addition, the liquidity provider reduces liquidity risk by a factor of
6
√
3/7 ≈ 1.5, again regardless of the values of other parameters in the model.
IV Model with a Liquidity Provider and Market
Information
In general, for a market of N securities, the average reservation price of the dif-
ferent securities at market clearing t can be written,
r̄t = m̄t + ft, (30)
ft ∼ N(0,Σ), (31)
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and the average equilibrium price over the market clearing interval can be written,
m̄t = m̄t−1 + et, (32)
et ∼ N(0,Ψ), (33)
where r̄, m̄, f̄ , and ē are N × 1 vectors and Σ and Ψ are N ×N matrices.
For a market of relatively few securities, it is not too difficult to calculate estimates
of m̄t (denoted m̂t) and to determine liquidity risk when Σ and Ψ are fully speci-
fied. The process involves numerically solving the appropriate discrete time algebraic
Riccati equation (see the Appendix) and then using this solution in straightforward
equations. Analytic results, however, are often extremely messy – even for just two
securities.
In order to present analytic results, we treat the model with a liquidity provider
in a market with many assets as a special case of a two security market where the




























where % is the correlation of the difference between reservation prices and equilibrium
prices across the two assets, and ρ is the correlation of equilibrium price changes
across the two assets. We make an idealized assumption that order flow for the






The liquidity provider, therefore, has noiseless information about the average equi-
librium price of the market security at each clearing.
A Liquidity
Liquidity risk is,
VM = Var[(m̂t − m̄t) + (m̄t −mi)], (38)
= Var[m̂t − m̄t] + Var[m̄t −mi] + 2 Cov[m̂t − m̄t, m̄t −mi], (39)
= S(1,1) + φ1τψ
2 + 2(G(1,1) − 1)φ2τψ2 + 2G(1,2)φ2ρτψψM , (40)
where S(1,1), G(1,1), and G(1,2) are the respective elements of the matrices used in
the Kalman filter when solving for m̂t. A derivation of this equation is given in the
Appendix.
Solving the Riccati equation and plugging into Eq.40 (see the Appendix),
VM =
2 (φ1 + 2φ2Θ) τψ














where Θ ≡ 1− ρ2. Again, assuming that the investor’s arrival time is not correlated
with the timing of market clearings, then liquidity risk is the expectation over φ,
VM =














In Fig. 2, we show liquidity risk, VM , as a function of the time between market
clearings, τ , when ψ = 1, σ = 1, ω = 10, and with Θ = 0 to Θ = 1 in increments of
0.1. Liquidity risk decreases as the correlation of the asset with the market increases
(i.e., as Θ decreases). When the asset is perfectly correlated with the market, Θ =
0, liquidity risk is simply the line τψ2/4 and there is no risk when markets clear
continuously, τ = 0. When the asset is uncorrelated with the market, Θ = 1, liquidity
12












Figure 2: Liquidity risk, VM , as a function of the time between market clearings, τ ,
in a market with a liquidity provider and market information. Curves are shown for
parameters ψ = 1, σ = 1, ω = 10, and with ρ = 0 to ρ = 1 (Θ = 1 to Θ = 0 in
increments of 0.1).
risk is the same as if the market security was absent, VM = VL.


















1− 32Θ + 12Θ2 + (1 + 6Θ)
√
1 + 20Θ + 4Θ2
4Θ
. (45)
This equation goes to zero at the critical value Θc = 1/4, i.e., when ρ =
√
3/4 ≈ 0.87.
From then on, it is optimal for markets to clear continuously. In Fig. 3, we plot the
optimal interval, τ ∗, as a function of correlation with the market, ρ, for the three
13















Figure 3: Speed vs. correlation for the three models studied in the text. Parameters
used in the plot are ψ = 1, σ = 1, and ω = 10.
models. Notice how τ ∗M = 0 at the critical value ρ =
√
3/4.
For Θ > Θc, the minimum liquidity risk is,






where h2(Θ) and h3(Θ) are rather complicated functions. For Θ ≤ Θc, liquidity risk
is minimized when markets clear continuously, i.e., when τ = 0. The equation for








In Fig. 4, we compare liquidity risk for the three models studied in the text.
Parameters used in the plot are ψ = 1, σ = 1, ω = 10, and Θ = 0.3. We also










M). Notice how liquidity risk
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Figure 4: A comparison of liquidity risk, V , for the three models studied in the text.
Parameters used in the plot are ψ = 1, σ = 1, ω = 10, and Θ = 0.3 (ρ ≈ 0.84). The










M) are shown with asterisks.
decreases with the addition of the liquidity provider and reduces even further when
the market security is added.
V Estimating the Optimal Trading Interval
Because the model’s inputs (σ, ψ, Θ, and ω) are statistical properties of order
flow and returns, we can use rough estimates of these parameters to determine the
optimal clearing frequency of a typical U.S. stock. In this section, we do just that.
To standardize the calculation, we always use units of seconds in our estimates. As
a consequence, the final estimate of the optimal trading interval is given in seconds.
• For the standard deviation of the security’s value, we use ψ = 0.0001, which
corresponds to an annualized volatility of approximately 25%.
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• For the standard deviation of reservation prices, we use a typical percent spread,
σ = 0.0003, which is equivalent to a $0.01 quoted spread for a $33 stock.
• For the correlation of the security with the market, we use ρ = 0.75 so that
Θ = 0.4375.
• For the order arrival rate, we use two different values based on reported Tape
A/B quotation updates. There are approximately 15,000 quote changes per
second for Tape A/B securities during trading hours. During peak times, this
increases dramatically, to approximately 300,000 quote changes per second (see
www.utpplan.com for both estimates). Because approximately 3,000 securities
are reported on Tape A/B, we use the following estimates for the order arrival
rate, ω = 5 and ωpeak = 100.









Putting everything into the equation, we have
τ ∗ ≈ 0.9 seconds, (49)
and,
τ ∗peak ≈ 0.2 seconds. (50)
Our estimates suggest that a typical U.S. stock should trade at intervals of 0.2
to 0.9 seconds. Of course we do not wish to over-interpret this result. Individuals
place limit orders in the market instead of price schedules, the market security is not
really infinitely liquid, securities are correlated to many other securities in addition to
the market security, and liquidity providers (rather than investors) represent a large
fraction of the orders we use in our estimate of the order arrival rate. All of these
points may require us to tweak the final value and we would place error bands of up
16
to an order of magnitude around this estimate.
VI Conclusions
U.S. markets have undergone considerable changes over the last two decades.
Whereas before, trading was human mediated and quite slow (taking over half a
minute for a market order to execute), it is now electronic, automated, and extremely
fast (limited mainly by the speed of light). Market quality metrics have improved
considerably as market speeds have increased, but it is unclear if the current milli-
and microsecond environment is really necessary.
This paper attempts to determine the optimal speed of trading in financial mar-
kets. In our model of periodic market clearings, the optimal trading interval for a
security depends on three factors: (1) the volatility of the security, (2) the intensity
of trading in the security, and (3) the correlation of the security’s value with other
securities. All other things equal, a security should be traded more quickly if it is
volatile, has intense trading, and is highly correlated with other securities.
When plugging in rough estimates of the model parameters for a typical U.S.
stock, we calculate an optimal trading interval of 0.2 to 0.9 seconds. Delaying markets
longer than these intervals is likely to harm market quality. However, in light of these
estimates, for many securities it is hard to justify the extreme speeds at which U.S.
markets operate.
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The following is a straightforward application of the Kalman filter for the es-
timation of m̄t using contemporaneous and lagged values of r̄t (see Meinhold and
Singpurwalla (1983)). The observation equation is,
r̄t = m̄t + ft, (51)
ft ∼ N(0,Σ). (52)
and the system equation is,
m̄t = m̄t−1 + et, (53)
et ∼ N(0,Ψ). (54)
Denote by m̂t the estimate of m̄t based on {r̄t, r̄t−1, r̄t−2, . . . }. It can be shown that,
P (m̄t|̄rt, r̄t−1, . . . ) ∼ N(m̂t−1 + Gt [̄rt − m̂t−1], St), (55)
P (m̄t+1|̄rt, r̄t−1, . . . ) ∼ N(m̂t,Rt+1). (56)
where Gt is known as the Kalman gain and,
Gt = Rt(Rt + Σ)
−1, (57)
Rt+1 = St + Ψ, (58)
St = Rt −GtRt. (59)
The best estimate of m̄t based on {r̄t, r̄t−1, r̄t−2, . . . } is just the mean of the distribu-
tion P (m̄t|̄rt, r̄t−1, . . . ),
m̂t = m̂t−1 + Gt(r̄t − m̂t−1). (60)
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The estimation variance is
Var[m̂t − m̄t] = St. (61)
In general, the above equations are solved iteratively, starting at time zero. Here,
we search for convergence of the estimation variance to a limiting value, i.e., we
search for a solution when Rt+1 = Rt. Rearranging the above equations and setting
R = Rt+1 = Rt produces the following equation,
R(R + Σ)−1R−Ψ = 0, (62)
which is a version of the discrete time algebraic Riccati equation. The conditions
required for a solution to exist are discussed in Anderson and Moore (2005). Note
that when R has reached its steady state, that G and S will also be steady. Once R
is determined, then G and S can be calculated as follows,
G = ΨR−1, (63)
S = R−Ψ. (64)
Solving the Riccati Equation
In the model with a liquidity provider who does not have access to market infor-
mation, all variables in the Kalman filter are scalars. Furthermore,
Σ = σ2/(ωτ), (65)
Ψ = τψ2. (66)
The Riccati equation is therefore,
R2/(R + σ2/(ωτ))− τψ2 = 0, (67)
20
















τ 2ψ4 + 4ψ2σ2/ω − τψ2
]
, (70)










Solving the Riccati equation,
R =































(1/2) [Θτψ2 (−1 +√1 + 4σ2/ωΘτ2ψ2)] 0
0 0
 (74)
where Θ ≡ 1− ρ2. Note that when the security is uncorrelated with the market, i.e.,
Θ = 1, that the elements R(1,1), G(1,1), and S(1,1) all reduce to the values found in
the case when the liquidity provider has no market information (Eqs. 68-70).
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Liquidity Risk
The equation for the liquidity risk of an investor trading the security when a
liquidity provider is present is,
VL,M = Var[(m̂t − m̄t) + (m̄t −mi)], (75)
= Var[m̂t − m̄t] + Var[m̄t −mi] + 2 Cov[m̂t − m̄t, m̄t −mi]. (76)
We will start with the first term, Var[(m̂t − m̄t)]. The estimation variance of m̄t is
just S (see Eq.61). For the security, the variance is reported at position (1, 1),
Var[m̂t − m̄t] = S(1,1). (77)
The second term is derived in the text (Eq. 16),
Var [m̄t −mi] = (1/2)
[





where φ1 ≡ (1/2) [φ3 + (1− φ)3].
The third term, 2Cov[m̂t − m̄t, m̄t −mi], can be derived as follows. Subtracting
m̄t from both sides of Eq. 60 and rearranging,
m̂t − m̄t = (I−Gt) (m̂t−1 − m̄t−1) + Gt (r̄t − m̄t) + (Gt − I) (m̄t − m̄t−1) , (80)
where I is the identity matrix. The elements in the vectors (I −Gt)(m̂t−1 − m̄t−1)
and Gt (r̄t − m̄t) are uncorrelated with (m̄t −mi) so we can disregard them. In the
last vector, (Gt − I) (m̄t − m̄t−1), the relevant contribution to m̂t − m̄t is the first
element,
(G(1,1) − 1)(m̄t − m̄t−1) + G(1,2)(m̄M,t − m̄M,t−1). (81)
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The covariance of the random terms in this equation with (m̄t −mi) are,
Cov[m̄t − m̄t−1, m̄t −mi] = φ2τψ2, (82)
Cov[m̄M,t − m̄M,t−1, m̄t −mi] = φ2ρτψψM . (83)
where φ2 ≡ (1/4) [φ3 + 2(1− φ)3 + 3(1− φ)φ2]. The structure of φ2 can be derived
by noting the covariance of the difference of averaged points of a Brownian motion
with the difference of an averaged point and a particular point of the same Brownian
motion. The result is left for the reader to verify.
Putting everything together, we have,
VL,M = Var[(m̂t − m̄t) + (m̄t −mi)], (84)
= Var[m̂t − m̄t] + Var[m̄t −mi] + 2 Cov[m̂t − m̄t, m̄t −mi], (85)
= S(1,1) + φ1τψ
2 + 2(G(1,1) − 1)φ2τψ2 + 2G(1,2)φ2ρτψψM , (86)
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